12 Жов Trade Agreements With Africa
The different protocols are negotiated in two phases (see figure below). Phase 1 focused on three protocols: trade in goods with its 9 annexes, trade in services with its 3 annexes and dispute settlement. Phase 2 negotiations will focus on protocols on competition, intellectual property rights and investment. Trudi Hartzenberg, the director general of the Trade Law Centre, a South Africa-based think tank, tells Africa Renewal that while the free trade area can significantly improve competitiveness and promote intra-African trade, it also requires “strong leadership and technical capabilities to assist member states in the upcoming negotiations. We are also witnessing strong flows of protectionism in the global economy. The removal of import duties could increase intra-African trade by more than 50 percent, while a reduction in non-tariff barriers will double the volume of trade, notes the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Yulia Vnukova advises in the Trade and Regional Integration Division (ETIRI) of the World Bank. Based on more than ten years of experience, Yulia`s current work focuses on trade policy and regional integration, with a focus on macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis of trade, trade and sectoral competitiveness, global value chains and private sector development in emerging countries in Europe, in Asia and Africa. The U.S.-Africa trade relationship is being overhauled — and if AGOA continues to be disrupted or replaced by bilateral free trade agreements, it could be a blow to a number of economies in the region. Although AGOA has been extended twice, the last time until 2025, has been under threat in the past four years due to the opening of tariffs on important steel and aluminum products and the suspension of duty-free access for clothing imports from Rwanda.
Further AGOA disruptions could devastate the region, especially in the medium to long term, as economies wish to recover from the effects of COVID-19. Related Content Africa in Brief The United States and Kenya are negotiating a free trade agreement. Will they succeed? Witney Schneidman and Brionne Dawson Wednesday, July 29, 2020 Future Development Two ASEAN Lessons for Regional Integration in Africa Souleymane Coulibaly Wednesday, July 29, 2020 Africa at the Heart of Trade in Times of Uncertainty: Prioritizing Regional Value Chains on Global Value Chains to Accelerate Economic Development in East Africa Andrew Mold and Anthony Mveyange Wednesday, April 15, 2020 Intra-African trade is currently only 16%, compared to 19% in Latin America, 51% in Asia, 54% in North America and 70% in Europe. In March 2018, at the 10th Extraordinary Meeting of the African Union on the AfCFTA, three separate agreements were signed: the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the Kigali Declaration; and the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. The Protocol on Free Movement aims to create a visa-free zone within the AfCFTA countries and to support the creation of the African Union passport.  At the Kigali Summit on 21 March 2018, 44 countries signed the AfCFTA, 47 the Kigali Declaration and 30 the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. Although it was a success, there were two notable holdouts: Nigeria and South Africa, The two largest economies in Africa.    As of July 2019, 54 of the 55 African Union states had signed the agreement, with Eritrea not having signed the agreement. Of these Member States, 27 have deposited their instruments of ratification.   To date, all African countries have signed the AfCFTA agreement and 54 national governments have formally committed to creating the AfCFTA, with the notable exception of Eritrea. The AfCFTA agreement has been ratified to date by 31 AU Member States, in particular Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d`Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Saharawi Republic, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Gambia, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
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